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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

the source of income has also been hidden from the public authority
granting the assistance, and to require the judgment creditor to have
the public assistance revoked so that he can collect his judgment
would be unduly burdensome.'5 4 Reading the Social Services Law together with the legislative plan evinced by CPLR 5226, especially
in light of the exemptions already provided by CPLR 5205, the inference is strong that the section 137 and 137-a exemptions were
meant to be strictly construed.
CPLR 6214(a): Designation of agent for service of process made pursuant to section 59 of Insurance Law held insufficient for service of
attachment levy.
Under the doctrine of Seider v. Roth,""; a New York plaintiff
may, through the process of attachment, gain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over an out of state defendant's interest in an insurance policy,
provided that interest is present in New York. In other words, the insurer must be amenable to New York attachment proceedings. CPLR
6214(a) provides that service of the order of attachment may be made
in the same manner as service of a summons with the exception that
"such service shall not be made by delivery of a copy to a person authorized to receive service of summons solely by a designation filed
pursuant to a provision of law other than rule 318." Notwithstanding
this clear exclusion the Supreme Court, Bronx County held, in Saggese
v. Peare, 6 that a designation made under section 59 of the New York
Insurance Law' 5" was "supplementary" to a designation under rule 318
and that an order of attachment served pursuant thereto was valid. In
so doing, the court expressed the fear that an opposite holding would
allow foreign insurance companies to frustrate the remedies contemplated by Seider. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed 0 s
this holding, pointing out that even if the section 59 designation is "supplementary," the language of that section limits its applicability to
"a contract delivered or issued for delivery or a cause of action arising in this state."'u 9 And, since plaintiff's action was based on an
accident in New Hampshire, the section was inapplicable.
reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his dependents, any payments required to be made by him . . .in satisfaction of other judgments and
wage assignments, the amount due on the judgment, and the amount being or to
be received ...
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As one authority indicated at the time of the lower-court holding, the fear that excluding a section 59 designation will hinder the
valid application of Seider is unfounded. 60 If the basis for a Seider
attachment exists - if the insurer is doing business in New York - it
is likely that he will maintain an office in-state and service could be
effected there.1 1 In Saggese, the record failed to show that the insurer
did business in New York; he was merely authorized (under section
59) to do business. This alone was not sufficient presence "to justify
16 2
this particular levy in the circumstances of this particular action"'
and the attachment was properly vacated.
CPLR 6214(e): Time extension after expiration of ninety-day period
permitted subject to the rights of intervening lienors.
The problems inherent in the holding of Seider v. Roth'6 3 are
manifold. 164 One illustration is the difficulty involved in perfecting the
levy made pursuant to an order of attachment. For, under CPLR
6214(e), a levy is only effective for a period of ninety days after service
of process unless: the sheriff has taken actual custody of the property;
a special proceeding to take custody has been commenced; or, the court
extends the ninety-day period. Where, as in Seider, the attached property consists of the defendant's interest in an insurance policy, the
plaintiff is placed in the unenviable position of attempting to secure
165
custody of an intangible.
Postulating that an extension of the ninety-day period is the only
real remedy available in this situation, the court in Cenkner v. Shafer 66
recently denied a motion to vacate an attachment upon the condition
that plaintiff move for said extension within 67 twenty days.
Since ninety days had already elapsed, the Cenkner court qualified
its order by adding that the extension would not prejudice the rights
of an intervening creditor. 68 Thus, the lien of a second attaching
creditor would move into first position on the ninety-first day, and the
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